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THE FACTS 
 
Ms SA was an eighteen year-old deaf and mute young woman. She had 
minimal sight in one eye, the intellectual capacity of an early teenager, and the 
reading age of a seven year-old. Her family (mother, father and three brothers) 
came from a Pakistani Muslim background; they spoke primarily Urdu and 
Punjabi. Ms SA was neither able to lip-read nor understand either of these 
languages; her only means of communication was through British Sign 
Language (BSL) which she had learned in a specialist educational unit for deaf 
children. None of her family had learned BSL; thus, communication between 
Ms SA and her family was very limited. Her family wished to arrange, or 
possibly even force her into, a marriage in Pakistan. She was happy to have an 
arranged marriage but wanted the right to veto any potential husband.  
Prior to her 18th birthday, the local authority had applied to make Ms SA a 
ward of court because it feared that she might be forced into marriage against 
her will. The court under its inherent parens patriae and wardship jurisdictions 
had granted protective injunctions to prevent any possibility of a forced 
marriage. The local authority and the guardian remained concerned that Ms 
SA, as a vulnerable adult, would require continued protection when the 
wardship ended when she attained the age of majority. It therefore applied 
successfully to the court to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court 
and obtain a protective order to safeguard Ms SA’s future welfare.  
 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE DECISION IN RE SA 
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The decision in Re SA is important for a number of reasons. First, it 
confirms that the inherent jurisdiction is an extremely broad-based jurisdiction 
which has the capability of protecting vulnerable adults’ interest in the same 
way as the wardship jurisdiction does for children. Munby J, in a lengthy and 
detailed judgment explained the extensive development of the inherent 
jurisdiction since the House of Lords rediscovered its potential in Re F (Mental 
Patient: Sterilisation) ([1990] 2 AC 1), and the current scope of the doctrine. In 
Re F, the House of Lords held that it was open to the court under the inherent 
jurisdiction to make a declaration that the proposed sterilisation operation was 
in a mentally incompetent female patient's best interests. She could not give 
consent to the surgery herself yet without the proposed operation, as a sexually 
active adult, she was at risk of an unwanted, and potentially very frightening, 
pregnancy. She would be totally incapable of caring for any child.  
Second, the decision is of interest because it raises further important and 
overlapping questions including the nature and circumstances of the requisite 
mental capacity of a vulnerable adult who wishes to marry; the competing 
interests of the rights to self determination under Arts 8 (the right to respect for 
family and private life), 12 (the right to marry), and 14 (the right to enjoy the 
rights under the Convention without discrimination) of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950 (ECHR 1950) versus the need to protect vulnerable adults from 
exploitation from prospective partners and family members, and, finally, the 
problematic issue of recognising the value of arranged marriages for vulnerable 
adults in cultures where such marriages  are considered to be the norm, whilst 
ensuring that parties  are protected from exploitation in the form of forced 
marriages by their families or by  third parties.   
According to Munby J, a vulnerable adult is not a term of art; it is 
descriptive not definitive; indicative not prescriptive. It includes anyone:   
 
“… who, whether or not mentally incapacitated, and whether 
or not suffering from any mental illness or mental disorder, is 
or may be unable to protect him or herself against significant 
harm or exploitation, or who is deaf, blind or dumb, or who is 
substantially handicapped by illness, injury or congenital 
deformity.” 
 
THE DECISION IN RE SA 
 
Once Ms SA had attained the age of 18, Munby J was faced with the 
dilemma of how to protect her from an inappropriate marriage to which she did 
not freely consent. There were three possible solutions to this dilemma.  
First, he could have found her to be mentally incapable of contracting a 
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valid marriage. This he was not anxious to do; his aim was to ensure, if at all 
possible, that she should lead a happy and fulfilled life as a woman, wife and 
mother and, thereby, safeguard her rights under the ECHR 1950. He explicitly 
stated that his concern 
 
“… must be to enable this vulnerable young woman to 
exercise her right to self-determination, specifically her right 
to marry as enshrined in Art 12 of the Convention. Like Singer 
J, (see below in Re SK (Proposed Plaintiff) (An Adult by way 
of her Litigation Friend) ([2005] 2 FLR 230)) I emphasise the 
importance these courts place on the right of the individual to 
exercise choice in this most intimate area of decision-making.” 
 
Second, he could find that Ms SA had the mental capacity to marry and in 
so doing the court would have no jurisdiction or role in protecting her from the 
risk of  an inappropriate if not  forced marriage. Although such a marriage 
would be voidable at her request (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.12 (c)),if she 
were to make such a request , the courts have been reluctant to allow an event 
to happen which would later require rectification with all the attendant 
possibilities of destabilising the vulnerable person still further (see below M v 
B, A and S (by the Official Solicitor) ([2006] 1 FLR 117). 
Third, he could find that she could be regarded as a vulnerable adult with 
capacity to marry but requiring the protective power of the inherent jurisdiction 
to safeguard her best interests in the same way as they had been protected by 
the wardship jurisdiction during her minority. Munby J decided to take this 
third route. Appropriately drafted injunctions, he thought, could  
 
“… protect SA's private life, in particular to ensure that her 
private life is not jeopardised by her parents' actions in seeking 
to arrange a marriage for her. In striving to meet this objective 
I am, in other words, giving effect to the court's duties under 
Art 8 of the Convention.” 
 
CAPACITY TO MARRY 
 
The psychologist who evaluated Ms SA, assisted by a BSL interpreter, 
acknowledged the problems in determining the nature of her mental capacity. 
The nature of psychological testing uses both verbal and non-verbal 
communication; the former is inappropriate for a deaf person who is only 
capable of understanding non-verbal communication, and the validity of the 
results was therefore likely to be compromised. 
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Munby J found the psychologist’s report to be so ‘remarkable, sympathetic 
and illuminating’ that he quoted in detail from it. Ms SA’s non-verbal IQ was 
found to be in the borderline range of ability and her verbal ability, although 
incapable of assessment, was assumed to be in the learning disability range. 
The psychologist, in his discussion of her suggestibility, found that 
 
“…it is highly likely that the nuances of any conversation that 
were occurring around her, even if translated to BSL, would 
not be understood by her. Therefore, I believe that although 
she may not be particularly suggestible, it would be extremely 
easy to mislead her and in that sense she would be both 
suggestible and vulnerable.” 
 
Thus, Ms SA’s ability to understand information, and express her own 
views, was severely limited. However, the psychologist concluded that Ms SA 
had 
 
“…a rudimentary but nevertheless clear and accurate 
understanding of the concept of marriage and of what a 
marriage contract would entail; that she has an accurate and 
realistic understanding of what a sexual relationship is, its 
effect and implications, and what would be expected within 
the relationship, and that she understands that a marriage can 
be legally ended in divorce.” 
 
However, he drew attention to the fact that although Ms SA understood the 
concept of marriage in general, she did not appear to be able to grasp the 
ramifications of the specificities of her proposed marriage. She was clear in her 
own mind that she wanted to have an arranged marriage to an English speaking 
Muslim man, and that she would probably have to go to Pakistan to meet him. 
She was adamant that any potential husband would have to return with her to 
the UK as her fiancé and marry her in the UK. She expected to have the right of 
veto over whom she might marry and not be forced into marriage.  However, 
according to her social worker and her guardian, Ms SA was very naive and 
immature; the psychologist also recognised this. He found that she was unable 
to comprehend the very real possibility that her parents might take her to 
Pakistan, organize her marriage, whilst she was there to a man who would not, 
or could not, because of immigration rules, return with her and live in the UK. 
If that were to happen, Ms SA would be unable to express her concerns to 
anyone in Pakistan or obtain help to return to the UK. She might then be 
compelled to remain in a country where she would be unable to communicate 
with anyone in BSL, including the man she might have been forced to marry. 
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Such a possibility would result in her leading an isolated existence and her 
mental health would suffer severely.  
To the reader, the psychologist’s conclusions, in the light of his and the 
social worker and guardian’s views of Ms SA’s general mental ability, may 
seem somewhat confusing. However, Munby J, purported to follow his own 
test of mental capacity to marry which he had expressed in Re E (An Alleged 
Patient); Sheffield City Council v E and S ([2005] Fam 326) and held that Ms 
SA fulfilled the requirements of that test and did have the capacity to marry.  
 
MENTAL CAPACITY IN RE E 
 
In Re E, Munby J stated the fundamental requirement that  any person  
wishing to marry must  have the mental capacity to do so. Without such 
capacity, any marriage would be voidable (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
s.12(c)). In his view, the general rule of English law relating to capacity in any 
context is to ‘understand the nature and quality of the act’. Thus, the test for 
establishing mental capacity relating to marriage, requires a person wishing to 
enter into a valid marriage to know that he or she is taking part in a marriage 
ceremony and understands the words of the ceremony; he or she must also be 
able to appreciate the responsibilities which stem from the contract of marriage 
agreed to in that ceremony. According to Munby J, the marriage contract 
confers on the man and woman the status of husband and wife. From this status 
flow consequences. The parties are expected, inter alia, to live together, love 
only each other as husband and wife, and be responsible for each other’s care 
and comfort.  
Given the nebulous nature of the State determined English marriage 
contract, it might be argued that Munby J’s test is a very high hurdle for a 
mentally vulnerable adult to leap. After all, it is not always easy for a mentally 
competent adult to appreciate the full significance of the marriage contract, 
which is an unwritten one, and can only be compiled from a reading of case 
law and statute, (primarily, relating to marital breakdown). This is not the 
reading matter of most couples who are about to embark on marriage, and 
certainly not of a vulnerable adult on the borderline of learning ability with a 
reading age of a seven year-old.  
However, Munby J did not share this view. He maintained, on the authority 
of Park v Park ([1954] P 112), that the contract of marriage is essentially a 
very simple one, and does not require a high degree of intelligence to 
comprehend it. He was, quite understandably, anxious to avoid discriminating 
against those of limited mental ability, whose lives could might benefit 
substantially from marriage, were the test of capacity to marry be set too high. 
However, he did not question the realism of her expressed views relating to 
whom, and how, she wished to marry nor did he acknowledge the dilemma in 
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finding that Ms SA had the mental capacity to marry whilst at the same time 
accepting the psychologist’s finding that she had a mental age of thirteen. He 
simply stated that the question whether a person has capacity to marry is a 
generalized one; it does not relate to the implications of marriage to, or wisdom 
in marrying, a specific person.  No court may rule on whether it is in a person’s 
best interest to marry any particular partner, and no court may give consent to 
marriage on behalf of anyone who lacks capacity to give his or her own 
consent.  
The psychologist in Re SA had also found that Ms SA did not have the 
capacity to conduct litigation. However, Munby J held that capacity is issue 
specific and that a person could lack mental capacity with respect to certain 
matters but have capacity in other areas of her life. In particular, he accepted 
that Ms SA could have the mental capacity to marry but lack the mental 
capacity to litigate in relation to that marriage.  
 
THE INHERENT JURISDICTION 
 
It was evident that Ms SA would require help if she were to be allowed to 
marry on her own terms. Munby J proceeded to consider the nature of the 
inherent jurisdiction and its capacity to protect vulnerable adults. In his view, 
the jurisdiction is, in both substance and reality, the same for vulnerable adults 
as the wardship jurisdiction is for children.  He described it as a protective 
jurisdiction which is based on the common law doctrine of necessity. Although 
its use in the past was primarily in relation to the medically incompetent and 
medical treatment, it’s application was, he thought, theoretically, limitless. He 
maintained that since Re F, the potential of the inherent jurisdiction had been 
developed and was likely to continue to be extended in accordance with the 
courts’ responsibilities to safeguard human rights under the ECHR 1950.  
Munby J began his analysis of the non-medical decisions, in which the 
inherent jurisdiction had been invoked, with the case of Re C (Mental Patient: 
Contact) ([1993] 1 FLR 940). Eastham J, in Re C, had no difficulty in giving an 
affirmative answer to the preliminary question of whether the inherent 
jurisdiction could be used to grant a mother staying contact with her mentally 
ill adult daughter, and an order that the father, with whom the daughter was 
living, must not obstruct such contact. The daughter would otherwise be, in 
effect, a prisoner of her father. Eastham J explained  
 
“I have come to the conclusion that if the plaintiff had wished 
there was material, if her contentions are right, to found an 
application for habeas corpus, and I am inclined to agree with 
the submission that if the grounds apply for relief in that 
drastic form it does support very much the contention that 
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there should be relief available by way of the lesser 
declaration [of an order under the inherent jurisdiction]” 
 
In Re T (Adult: refusal of Treatment) ([1993 Fam 95]), the Appeal Court 
accepted that it could invoke the inherent jurisdiction to determine whether a 
normally mentally competent patient could be deemed to be ‘vulnerable’ 
because his or her consent, or lack of consent, to treatment  might have been 
compromised or vitiated by shock, fatigue, pain, drugs, or the undue influence 
of another.  
In Re G (An Adult) (Mental Capacity: Court’s Jurisdiction) ([2004] All ER 
(D) 33) an adult woman had a history of mental illness. By the time of the full 
hearing for a continuation of the protective framework which had been put in 
place by interlocutory orders, the woman’s mental capacity had improved 
significantly. Those orders had had the effect of protecting her from her 
parents’ overbearing influence and demands, and, as a result, her mental health 
had improved. Although Ms G no longer needed the orders, were they to be 
removed, she was likely to revert to her previously disturbed state. Bennett J 
explained persuasively and sensibly that 
 
“…it would be a sad failure were the law to determine that I had 
no jurisdiction to investigate and if necessary make declarations as 
to G’s best interests to ensure that the continuing protection of the 
court put in place … is not summarily withdrawn simply because 
she has now regained her mental capacity in respect of the matters 
referred to, given the likely consequences to G if the court 
withdrew its protection.” 
 
In M v B, A and S (by the Official Solicitor) ([2006] 1 FLR 117), Sumner J 
used the inherent jurisdiction to declare that Ms S lacked capacity to marry. He 
made orders to prevent the risk of her parents taking her to Pakistan for an 
arranged or a forced marriage. These would prevent the risk of Ms S suffering 
serious emotional and psychological damage. Although any such marriage 
would clearly be voidable at the request of either party, the court regarded it as 
preferable that it was better to prevent damage in the first instance than to 
attempt to repair the harm incurred after the event.  
Munby J, finally, considered the decision in Re SK (Proposed Plaintiff) (An 
Adult by way of her Litigation Friend) ([2005] 2 FLR 230). This illustrates the 
use of the inherent jurisdiction, in perhaps the most innovative of all ways, to 
protect a potentially vulnerable young adult woman. She was not mentally 
incapacitated in the accepted sense of the term but was regarded as vulnerable 
because of her cultural background which led to pressures being put upon her 
to marry in conformity with her parents’ wishes.  
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The Foreign and Commonwealth Office had learned that the woman, who 
lived in England and was of Bangladeshi origin, was somewhere in 
Bangladesh, probably against her will, because her family, consisting of her 
parents and brothers, wanted to force her to marry there. The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office requested that a solicitor take action on her behalf; the 
woman knew absolutely nothing of the court proceedings.  
 
Singer J explained his view that  
 
“…the inherent jurisdiction now, like wardship has been, is a 
sufficiently flexible remedy to evolve in accordance with 
social needs and social values. If an adult is deprived of the 
capacity to make relevant decisions, then, if there is 
disagreement about what should be done in his or her best 
interests, or if there is a serious issue as to the propriety of 
what is proposed, recourse can be had to the court for 
declaratory relief.” 
 
He held that the jurisdiction could be exercised even in the absence of the 
vulnerable person, and without their knowledge, and proceeded to make orders 
and issue directions to discover whether the woman was being forced to marry 
and/or remain in Bangladesh against her will. Her family was ordered to allow 
her to be interviewed at the High Commission in Bangladesh to find out what 
she really wanted to do. The order included injunctions restraining the family 
from arranging any marriage or threatening or using violence against the 
woman. Such an order, Singer J believed, would encourage others outside the 
family to cooperate with the High Commission. Other orders required the 
woman’s relatives, who were living in England, to appear before the High 
Court. The orders had the desired effect. The relatives communicated with the 
woman and her family in Bangladesh. The woman was interviewed in 
Bangladesh by a British Consular officer. She returned to England and 
explained that she did not need the court’s help and the proceedings came to an 
end. 
 
THE COMMON THREAD 
 
Munby J concluded that all the decisions relating to the inherent 
jurisdiction had a common thread running through them. He explained that   
 
“The inherent jurisdiction can be invoked wherever a 
vulnerable adult is, or is reasonably believed to be, for some 
reason deprived of their capacity to make the relevant 
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decision, or disabled from giving or expressing a real and 
genuine consent. The cause may be, but is not for this purpose 
limited to, mental disorder or mental illness. A vulnerable 
adult who does not suffer from any kind of mental incapacity 
may nonetheless be entitled to the protection of the inherent 
jurisdiction if he or she is, or is reasonably believed to be, 
incapacitated from making the relevant decision by reason of 
such things as constraint, coercion, undue influence or other 
vitiating factors.” 
 
WHO MAY APPLY? 
 
According to Munby J, applications for orders under the inherent 
jurisdiction may be made by anyone, including a local authority, who is not 
merely a stranger or an officious busybody, with a genuine and legitimate 
interest in the vulnerable adult’s welfare. It is not restricted to friends or 
relatives; the latter may well be the persons from whom the vulnerable adult 
most needs protection. 
 
 THE ORDER 
 
Munby J’s ambition was to ensure that Ms SA had the best possible chance 
of future happiness by being allowed to marry and have children, and on her 
own terms. To that end, he made an order which would last until Ms SA 
married or applied herself for it to be discharged. The terms of the order were 
detailed and extensive: 
The parents were prohibited from  
(a) physically harming, threatening, intimidating or harassing their 
daughter by themselves or through third parties;  
(b) preventing their daughter from communicating, via a BSL 
interpreter, with her solicitor;  
(c) applying for travel documents for their daughter, either by 
themselves or through third parties; 
(d) removing their daughter from the jurisdiction of England and Wales 
without the express written consent, translated into BSL and notarized 
by their daughter’s solicitor; 
(e) making arrangements for their daughter’s marriage either by 
themselves or through third parties unless: 
 
i. the daughter gives her voluntary express written consent, 
translated and explained in BSL to her and notarized by her 
solicitor; 
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ii. the future bridegroom gives his voluntary written notarized 
consent to allow Ms SA to return to her home town within 4 
months of the marriage ceremony regardless of whether he has 
been given immigration clearance for himself, and, if he is 
given immigration clearance, to live in her home town with 
her; allow a visit by a worker from the British High 
Commission in Pakistan to visit within 4 months of any 
marriage ceremony to interview Ms SA with a BSL interpreter 
to ascertain whether she wished to return to England. 
 
Ms SA’s passport was ordered to be deposited with her solicitor and not to 
be released to her unless she has given her express written consent, translated 
and explained in BSL and notarised by the solicitor 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The decision in Re SA demonstrates a sensitive attempt by Munby J to deal 
with the cultural issue of arranged and, potentially,  forced marriages, in the 
particularly difficult context of a mentally vulnerable adult.  The decision 
shows a respect and support for arranged marriages where they are an 
important part of cultural expectations, whilst at the same time taking a strong 
stance against forced marriages. Adult offspring of first generation immigrants 
often live divided lives across two cultures. Outside home, they have adapted to 
a different set of cultural values from those which prevail within the home. It 
may prove difficult for them to protest against their parents’ wishes, relating to 
marriage, which conflict with their own. They may require help to cope with 
the problem. The inherent jurisdiction is clearly, at least theoretically, a useful, 
yet perhaps underused tool, within the panoply of solutions which have been 
proposed to help eliminate forced marriages (see http://www.fco.gov.uk).  
Munby J’s judgment is not, however, entirely without problems. Although 
his aim was to protect Ms SA’s rights under the EHCR 1950, the order may 
actually limit her ability to safeguard those rights. First, it is evident that she 
will require her parents’ help in order to marry yet the terms imposed on them 
under the order may, in effect, impede them from arranging a marriage in 
Pakistan. Potential husbands with different cultural expectations about 
marriage may have difficulty in understanding the requirement that they must 
sign, and have notarized, legal documents relating to their future life with Ms 
SA.  Second, the nature of the order inevitably imposes significant limits on Ms 
SA’s right to privacy. Although the court held that she could apply for the 
order to be discharged, it is questionable whether any court would do so if it 
believed her to be still at risk. 
Finally, the decision draws attention to the problematic nature of mental 
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capacity to marry.  Munby J glossed over the dilemma of how an adult with the 
mental capacity of a thirteen year-old can be said to understand the 
complexities of the contract of marriage. He simply held that she had capacity. 
Had he been prepared to extend the inherent jurisdiction still further to 
encompass decision making with respect to whether a specific marriage was in 
a vulnerable person’s best interests or for the court to consent to marriage on a 
vulnerable person’s behalf, he could have avoided stretching the test of 
capacity to marry to its limits. Such a development would have improved the 
lives of the many mentally incapacitated adults who could benefit from both 
the emotional and practical advantages which marriage can offer. They are 
currently denied the benefits of marriage because of the limits placed on the 
ambit of the inherent jurisdiction. The inherent jurisdiction already gives the 
court the power to prevent an incapacitated person from entering into marriage 
and probably the power to help mentally incapacitated persons, who have 
entered into voidable marriages, to escape from them. If a voidable marriage 
can be shown to be damaging to the best interests of the mentally incapacitated 
spouse, it would be unacceptable to leave him or her trapped in that marriage. 
Without the aid of the court, such persons would find it impossible to apply for 
a decree of nullity against their spouse’s will. 
 It remains for another court to be courageous enough to develop the 
inherent jurisdiction still further.  
